Analysis on the Relationship Between Ezecutive Compensation and Over-investment in U.S. Banks
This paper shows that the principal intention of executives to make over-investment is increasing their total profit owing to the theory model of the relationship between executive compensation and overinvestment. And then the paper utilizes Principal Components Analysis to establish the comprehensive growth opportunity function of U.S. investment banks and gets the normal investment demand of U.S. banks through analyzing the correlation between sample investment expenditures and comprehensive growth opportunity values, tests that there is overinvestment in US investment banks. After that, this paper tests the active correlation between executive compensation and over-investment by establishing liner regression model, and the conclusion is that over-investment volume is what causes CEO compensation to change. At last the paper gives some policy advices directed at over-investment.
Over-investment Ezecutive Compensation U.S. Investment Banks
LIANG Yan SUN Heng LI Shuang
Department of Economics Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, Liaoning, 116024
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
1695-1700
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）