COOPERATION IN SERVICE SYSTEMS

摘要：

We study a cost allocation problem in service management, where a group of servers, each characterized by its capacity and stream of customers, may cooperate and generate a single pooled server system with an arrival/service rate being the sum of the respective individual rates. The cost of a coalition is the equilibrium mean number of customers in the pooled system. We define the problem as a transferable utility cooperative game, and show that the grand coalition is beneficial. We fully characterize the non-negative core of the game, albeit the fact that the game is neither monotone nor concave. We also study core allocations in which some servers pay the others in order to make them join the coalition.

关键词： Cooperative games Core Queuing Theory

作者: S. Anily M. Haviv

作者单位: Faculty of Management, Tel Aviv University, TeL Aviv, Israel Department of Statistics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第二十届国际生产研究大会

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-7

在线出版日期: 2009-08-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）