Evolutionary Intelligence and Complezity Management in Social Economic Systems

摘要：

In this paper, we propose a simple yet e.ective theoretical model for the evolutionary threshold public goods game with binary contributions (each individual makes decision to contribute a fixed donation amount or nothing), incorporating the e.ect of the collective risk. In order to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the collective cooperative behavior, we analyze the population dynamics represented by the replicator equation. The result shows that high risk rate can enhance the emergence of social cooperation as well as the provision of public goods. Besides, other elements can also promote the cooperation, such as large initial endowment, small threshold, large cost of cooperation below the baseline of each cooperator, and large group size. In addition, our model can lead to rich dynamics. Scenarios of defection dominance, cooperation and defection bistable, cooperation and defection coexistence, and cooperation dominance may appear successively with the change of parameters.

关键词： Threshold Public Goods Game Social Economic Systems Replicator Dynamics

作者: Jing Wang Mei Zhu Fujun Ren Long Wang

作者单位: Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China China Research Institute for Science Popularization, China Association for Science and Technology, B

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)

会议地点: 广西桂林

会议语种:英文

页码: 59-64

在线出版日期: 2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）