Strategic R&D Investment: A Game Theoretic Real Options Approach
This paper applies the theory of option games to discuss the strategic decision rules in corporate R&D investment under uncertainty and competition, with three uncertainties in terms of income, cost and technology considered. The results show that there exist both preemptive equilibrium and simultaneous equilibrium in R&D investment game and exists mixed strategy equilibrium in preemptive equilibrium; and the increase of uncertainty is not always to rise the optimal threshold when considering many uncertain factors which are correlative; reversely, the increase of correlation and hazard rate of R&D technology will minish the threshold. Our analytical result in theory is further verified and enriched by a numerical example at last.
R&D Investment Decision Real Options Duopoly Option Games
Yu Dongping
Institute of National Defense Economy and Management, Central University of Finance and Economics , Beijing 100081
国际会议
2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)
广西桂林
英文
1547-1552
2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）