Optimal Procurement Contract between Contractor and Supplier in Large-Scale Projects

摘要：

Procurement management is an important process in large-scale projects because large-scale projects heavily depend on building materials from suppliers. This paper develops a model of material procurement in large-scale projects using the quality of material as decision-making variable. The optimal contract specifying quality and price between the contractor and the supplier is given. In addition, we present analytical and computational results related to the equilibrium solution. We find that the lower the cost of the supplier, the higher the efficiency, thus the supplier will provide higher quality materials; the higher the risk parameter of the contractor, the higher the quality of material will be; the higher the suppliers cost, the higher the risk sensitivity of the contractor.

关键词： Large-Scale Project Material Procurement Optimal Contract Game Theory Optimal Control Theory

作者: Dong FAN Tiao-jun XIAO Jiao JIN

作者单位: School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)

会议地点: 广西桂林

会议语种:英文

页码: 3524-3529

在线出版日期: 2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）