Contract Design of Quality Control in Supply Chain Based on Hidden Action
The problem how to design a quality control contract in supply chain theory is discussed on a basis of principal-agent. A system consisting of a risk neural supplier and a risk neural seller is considered, in which the seller buys an intermediate good from the supplier. When both the suppliers quality prevention costs and the sellers quality appraisal costs cant be observed by the other party, the problem of double hidden action will occur. General and concrete quality control models are established. In these models, two incentive measurements are taken: one is the penalty paid by the supplier to the seller when the seller identify a defective product, and the other is the penalty paid by the supplier to the seller when the defective product is found after being sold to customer. The results show that the appropriate penalty to the party with hidden action can reduce the influence of double hidden action and improve the quality of products sold to customers in designing contract of quality control.
Hidden Action Asymmetric Information Principal-Agent Theory Quality Control Supply Chain
Li Lijun Yu Liping Huang Xiaoyuan
School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110004
国际会议
2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)
广西桂林
英文
3595-3598
2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）