Incentive Pricing for Optimal Provisioning of Service Class Promotion with Network
The dynamic pricing management strategy of network system is established in this paper. By introducing the CobbDouglas demand function and using the optimization theory and economic boundary theory, the scalable connection management strategy for QoS-enabled networks is studied to make the benefits of the network system and non-cooperative users maximizing and the calculation methods are presented to give the optimal provisioning and dynamic pricing of multiple service classes networks. In order to encourage and guide the non-cooperative users to select the serving request, which is stable at the optimal provisioning of the network system, the nonlinear and crossly influencing incentive pricing strategy is given by introducing the idea of game theory. The users will be amerced in economy when the demand of users deviate the expectation, this will be benefit to increase the rate of network resource using. This management strategy meets the demands of an increasing number of network users as well as a wide variety of network applications. The rationality and validity is verified by the simulator example.
Correspondence Technique Pricing provisioning Incentive Stackelberg Strategy Service Level Agreement
Yue Xiao-ning Jing Yuan-wei
College of Science, Shenyang University, Shenyang Liaoning, 110044, China Faculty of Information Science & Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang Liaoning, 110004, Ch
国际会议
2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)
广西桂林
英文
4299-4304
2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）