Stackelberg game model of a supply chain under lead-time-dependent demand uncertainty
This paper develops a Stackelberg game theoretic model of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study pricing and production planning about lead-time and quantity. We assume that the retailer faces an uncertain demand where the uncertainty is related to lead-time. We investigate how uncertainty, capacity and salvage value influence the equilibrium outcome. We find that manufacturers maximum output within the lead-time is always equal to the retailers order quantity and the manufacturer can adjust the lead-time because the retailer can influence the demand by adjusting retail price. When the demand uncertainty is sufficiently small, the manufacturer shares most of the risk from demand uncertainty; otherwise, the retailer has to share part of the risk.
demand uncertainty pricing lead-time supply chain management game theory
Jiao JIN Tiao-jun XIAO Dong FAN
School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
国际会议
2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)
广西桂林
英文
4489-4493
2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）