Evolutionary Game Analysis on Innovation Strategy of Enterprises

摘要：

This paper studies how does the individual enterprise of the middle and large-sized enterprises clusters choose its own innovation strategy between independent innovation strategy and imitative innovation strategy and what effect does its choice have on itself and the whole society through evolutionary game theory. The conclusions reveal that on one hand, the governments most basic policy on encouraging enterprises to innovate is the sound system of intellectual property rights protection; on the other hand, the government may adjust the ratio of the enterprises which make independent innovation to the enterprises which make imitative innovation in the middle and large-sized enterprises clusters by tax policy, cost subsidies and so on, so as to make this innovation ratio more reasonable and more stable.

关键词： National student loan Evolutionary game Duplicative dynamic Evolutionary stable strategy

作者: Lu Fang-yuan Jiao Ke-yan

作者单位: Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China Information Engineering department, Henan College of Finance & Taxation, Zhengzhou 450002, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)

会议地点: 广西桂林

会议语种:英文

页码: 4499-4504

在线出版日期: 2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）