Modeling Strategic Forward Contracting in Transmission Constrained Power Markets
Taking the effects of transmission network into account, strategic forward contracting induced by the interaction of generation firms strategies in the spot and forward markets is investigated. A two-stage game model is proposed to describe generation firms strategic forward contracting and spot market competition. This two-stage model is formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), in which each firms optimization problem in the forward market is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) with a parameter-dependent spot market equilibrium as the inner problem. A nonlinear complementarity method is employed to solve this EPEC model. A numerical example is used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed modeling and solution method.
Power market Strategic forward contracting Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) Nonlinear complementarity method.
Wang Xian Zhang Shaohua
Department of Automation, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200072, China
国际会议
2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)
广西桂林
英文
4541-4546
2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）