Effort Decision in Cooperative R&D with Moral Hazard

摘要：

Cooperative research and development (R&D) is commonly adopted in recent supply chain (SC). The effort level decision of supplier under moral hazard is discussed in this paper and the objective is to find the optimal decision strategy of suppliers in cooperative R&D. Applying maximal principle, the optimal decision strategy has been obtained.The results indicate that, due to moral hazard, the supplier makes more effort but suffers from less profits as the payment for the policy to incite the manufacturer. A numerical example is given to illustrate the strategy.

关键词： Moral Hazard Cooperative R&D Principal Agent Mazimum Principle

作者: Chang Tiantian Li Hua

作者单位: School of Automation &Electrical Engineering,Lanzhou Jiaotong University,Lanzhou 730070

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)

会议地点: 广西桂林

会议语种:英文

页码: 4776-4778

在线出版日期: 2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）