Supply Chain Coordination Based on Revenue-Sharing Contract with Retailer Having Loss-Averse Preferences
Revenue-Sharing (RS) contract is a kind of mechanism to improve the performance or to achieve the perfect coordination of supply chain (SC). In the paper, considering retailer has loss-averse preferences, a model of an SC contract aimed at coordinating a two-stage SC is proposed, which is based on revenue sharing mechanism, and the customer demand is stochastic. Then by analyzing the model, the paper explains that how the loss-averse preferences of the retailer influences the optimal order quantity, the quota of revenue sharing and supply chain coordination. The result shows: when the retailer has loss-averse preferences, there exists one order quantity that maximizes his expected utility; in 0, (1-φ)c and 1-w/v, 1-w/p, there respectively exists only one wholesale price that supplier charges retailer and only one quota of the retailers revenue that retailer gives to supplier; the wholesale price and the quota are both the decreasing functions of the retailers loss-averse preferences.
Supply Chain Management Revenue-Sharing Contract Loss-Averse Supply Chain Coordination Stochastic Demand Ezpected Utility
Qinghua Pang
Business School, HoHai University, Changzhou 213022, China
国际会议
2009年中国控制与决策会议(2009 Chinese Control and Decision Conference)
广西桂林
英文
5700-5704
2009-06-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）