会议专题

The Model of Signaling Games for the to Evaluate Its Venders Abilities

Because of the asymmetric information in the outsourcing market of research and development activity, it is difficult for outsourcer to identify the ability of the vendor, which usually causes outsourcer to make adverse selection. In order to avoid such a problem, this paper proposes a model of signaling game in terms of the innovative ability level, and also analyses the outsourcers best decision when the vendor transfers information to the outsourcer.

research and development outsourcing adverse selection signaling transfer

Wenjuan Zhu Cunlu Zhang

school of management,Xiamen University,China

国际会议

2009 6th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management( 2009 第六届服务系统与服务管理国际会议)

厦门

英文

314-317

2009-06-08(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)