The Model of Signaling Games for the to Evaluate Its Venders Abilities

摘要：

Because of the asymmetric information in the outsourcing market of research and development activity, it is difficult for outsourcer to identify the ability of the vendor, which usually causes outsourcer to make adverse selection. In order to avoid such a problem, this paper proposes a model of signaling game in terms of the innovative ability level, and also analyses the outsourcers best decision when the vendor transfers information to the outsourcer.

关键词： research and development outsourcing adverse selection signaling transfer

作者: Wenjuan Zhu Cunlu Zhang

作者单位: school of management,Xiamen University,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 6th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management( 2009 第六届服务系统与服务管理国际会议)

会议地点: 厦门

会议语种:英文

页码: 314-317

在线出版日期: 2009-06-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）