Service-Oriented or Control-Oriented Management in Venture Capital: Multi-agent and Multi-stage Game Analysis Approach --Empirical Evidence from China
Based on the latest research of neo-institutional economics, the frontier of corporate governance is extended, and the concept of service-oriented and control-oriented management in venture capital governance is brought forward. Game theory is applied systemically in this paper to discuss all stages of venture capital governance. Especially, we analyze the aspect of participation in the management of venture business by means of game theory. It is necessary and possible for the venture capitalist to participate in the management of the venture-backed firm, which contains the strategic, financing, and operation management, etc. On the basis of the literature review, we analyze the mechanisms and the patterns of the venture capitalists post-investment activities. A longer venture capitalists participation in a firm may increase its value while also increasing costs for the venture capitalist. After deeply investigating the venture capitalists active and the enterprisers choices involved, we set up the multi-agent and multi-stage dynamic models to analyze how their activities impact on each other and what the equilibrium result is. In conclusion, we study the real situation in China and the factors that impact the equilibrium result and put forward some proposals.
Service-Oriented Management Control Oriented Management Multi-agent and Multi-stage game Venture capital Venture capital governance
Yu Gu Song Chen
School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai,China
国际会议
2009 6th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management( 2009 第六届服务系统与服务管理国际会议)
厦门
英文
900-904
2009-06-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）