Asymmetric Pricing Game in Two-sided Platforms

摘要：

2-sideness has been a hot topic since early this century in economic and management issues. Network effects and platform competitions are major characteristics of the 2-sided market. This paper analyses an asymmetric duopoly game with network effects in 2-sided markets. We present a 2-platform-2-provider game, in which only one of the platforms is making the pricing decision in the first stage. Both of the indirect and direct networks effects (INE & DNE) are considered in our model. We derive the equilibrium of this Platform Stackelberg Game (PSG) and also give a series of analysis. One of the important conclusions is that joint optimality hardly exists when DNE is not considered. A group of numerical test is also provided on sensitivity of each players strategy.

关键词： 2-sided market platform pricing asymmetric structure duopoly game

作者: Yifan Dou Yongbo Xiao Jian Chen

作者单位: Management Science and Engineering,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China Management Science and Engineering,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084 China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 6th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management( 2009 第六届服务系统与服务管理国际会议)

会议地点: 厦门

会议语种:英文

页码: 921-926

在线出版日期: 2009-06-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）