Steady-State Security Analysis of Power System Based on the Operational Reliability Theory
Conventional steady-state security analysis have to compute the faults belonging to the predefined faults set in turn with out considering the small probability of the occurrence of some faults under certain circumstances. Although its results reflect the violation of the components precisely, they can not figure out how the violation affects the security of the system. The steady-state security analysis based on the operational reliability theory applies the state-depended models of the components in order to find the faults which would happen with high probability. As a result, only these faults should be calculated to decrease the computation time considerably. Further more, the reliability indices indicate the probability of the violation of the component as well as the influence of the violation on the system security, so that the security of the system can be evaluated comprehensively. IEEE RTS-79 test system is adopted in this paper to illustrate the differences between the conventional and the new steady-state security analysis methods. By contrast, it can be concluded that steady-state security analysis based on the operational reliability theory can calculate the influence of the variation of the component failure probability on the system security more specifically, which making the evaluation results more close to the practical operating system.
operational reliability steady-state security analysis reliability indices
Zou Xin Cheng Lin Sun Yuanzhang
State Key Lab of Control and Simulation of Power Systems and Generation Equipments (Department of Electrical Engineering, Tsinghua University) Beijing 100084
国际会议
温州
英文
157-161
2009-10-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）