Analysis on Effective Incentives Interval Base on the Principal-agent
A rational design of salary inventive plays a very important role in modern enterprise between the owner and the operator. This paper embarks from the output dispensing of corporation, according to the theory of principal-agent, building revenue expectation model of the owner and the operator in a corporation, which discuss the revenue changing of enterprise operator under asymmetric information through analysis on the efforts degree and expect revenue of operator under both symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. We find that: the owner can inspirit the operator effectively via designing reasonable salary distribution contract in the effective incentive interval. Meanwhile, the owner can regulate the width of effective incentive interval through effective means and at the same time satisfy operators requirement of effective incentive.
compensation incentive salary distribution effective incentive principal-agent
FU Chun RAO Wei
Nanchang University Center for Central China Economic Development Research, China 330047 Nanchang University Science of Management and Engineering, Nanchang China 330031
国际会议
2009 International SME Development Forum(2009 中小企业发展国际论坛)
北京
英文
488-492
2009-10-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）