Strategic Interactions between Manufacturers Direct Selling and Retailers Store Brand Introduction Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain
In this work, we explore a supply chain where the supplier considers whether to open a direct selling channel complementing with the retailing channel, and as a response, the retailer considers whether to introduce his store brand. We model this relationship by a four-stage dynamic game. We show that there exists an equilibrium solution for this game where the direct selling and store brand introduction are the dominant strategies for the supplier and the retailer, respectively. Moreover, we discuss the effects of the product and channel substitutability on supplier and retailers profits. We show that, the higher the product substitutability, the higher the retailers profit will be, and the higher the channel substitutability, the higher the suppliers profit will be.
Dual-channel supply chain Direct selling Store bran introduction Game theory
Jian Huang Jian Liu Shihua Luo
School of Information Management, Jiangxi University of Finance & Economy, Nanchang, 330013, Jiangxi, China
国际会议
南昌
英文
331-334
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）