A Novel Double Auction Mechanism Based Resource Allocation in the Grid

摘要：

In order to achieve high performance of Grid computing, an efficient resource allocation protocol needs to be carefully chosen and applied. Using auction mechanism design theory, this paper designs a novel double auction mechanism which is appropriate for allocation of multi-unit homogenous and divisible resources in the Grid. In the Grid, there are multiple resource consumers and resource providers. Furthermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred when a resource consumer trades with a resource provider. We prove that the mechanism not only can achieve incentive compatibility and individual rationality for risk-averse resource consumers and resource providers, but also can be weekly budget balance. The numeral results show that the mechanism achieves high efficiency.

关键词： Grid resource allocation double auction incentive compatibility efficiency

作者: Yajuan Wang Xianjia Wang

作者单位: Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, 430072, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 International Conference on Management of e-Commerce and e-Government ICMeCG 2009(第三届电子商务与电子政务管理国际会议)

会议地点: 南昌

会议语种:英文

页码: 420-423

在线出版日期: 2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）