Research of Second-mover Advantage in Technology Adoption Competition

摘要：

This paper probes into the second-mover advantages of dynamic technology adoption competition in a duopoly market. The time of product adoption in market and the costs of research and development (R&D) have direct effects on the existence and magnitude of a second -mover advantage. If R&D costs are low, the duopoly competit ion is mainly a preemption game, for there is no second -mover advantage. If technology adoption competition is mainly based on R&D effort, the game of technology adoption changes its nature form preempt ion to a waiting game with second-mover advantage.

关键词： dynamic game technology adoption second-mover advantage

作者: Lou Gaoxiang

作者单位: School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, P.R.China, 200237

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 4th International Conference on Productinnovation Management(第四届产品创新管理国际会议)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 374-379

在线出版日期: 2009-08-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）