Optimal Licensing Strategy of Patent holding Firm
In this paper we study the optimal patent licensing strategy where an inside (incumbent) patent holder and the potential entrant are different in marginal cost. We find that patent licensing strategy depend not only on the market demand but also on the marginal cost of licensee. Under asymmetric costs in production, we show that the royalty rate does not always dominate the fixed fee licensing for an inside patentee. We also discuss how to charge the optimal licensing fee which includes fixed fee and royalty rate, and present the value of patent licens ing.
paten asymmetric cost fized fee royalty rate optimal licensing strategy
Xue Minggao Liu Linlin Zhong Cui
School of management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, P.R.China, 430074
国际会议
4th International Conference on Productinnovation Management(第四届产品创新管理国际会议)
武汉
英文
748-758
2009-08-22(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)