Study on Financial Governance Mechanisms of Parent-Subsidiary Relationship in Enterprise Groups

摘要：

The logical starting point of financial governance of enterprise groups is the incomplete financial contract and the parent company is the subject of financial governance. Enterprise groups mainly aim to solve agency problems between parent and subsidiary companies and control the agency cost. This paper reveals financial governance mechanisms of parent -subsidiary relat ionship in enterprise groups by constructing a game model. It means that financial governance is an institutional arrangement which should have the function of realizing internalizat ion of external financial activities of subsidiary companies so as to maintain the consistency of overall interests of enterprise groups represented by parent and subsidiary companies.

关键词： incomplete contract enterprise groups financial governance

作者: Shi Daojin Yang Lin

作者单位: Institute of Accounting, Zhejiang Forestry University, Hangzhou, P.R.China, 311300

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 4th International Conference on Productinnovation Management(第四届产品创新管理国际会议)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1223-1226

在线出版日期: 2009-08-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）