Empirical Studies on Collusion between Major Shareholders & Company Managers and Supervision Efficiency

摘要：

There are different views in theoretical studies about whether major shareholders supervision over managers will be strengthened or weakened when major shareolders and managers collude together to infringe the interests of minority shareholders. This paper studies the issue by utilizing the data of listed companies in China from 2003 to 2005. Study shows that the opportunism conducts of managers of listed company are closely correlated with major shareholders occupation on the fund of listed company; the higher e xtent that ma jor shareholders occupy listed companys funds, the severer opportunism conducts managers have, which means that collusion between major shareholders and managers will wea ken ma jor shareholders supervision efficiency over co mpany managers.

关键词： collusion manager opportunism supervision efficiency

作者: Yan Yezhou Wang Zushan Yuan Di

作者单位: School of Management, Wuhan Institute of Technology, Wuhan, P.R.China,430205

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 4th International Conference on Productinnovation Management(第四届产品创新管理国际会议)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1238-1241

在线出版日期: 2009-08-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）