Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly in Assembly Supply Chain
We model an assembly system in which duopolistic assemblers compete with each other through advertising and meanwhile cooperate with their respective suppliers in generic advertising. With differential game theory, optimal advertising decisions for a dynamic duopoly as well as optimal sharing proportions for suppliers are obtained. We characterize equilibrium market shares, and then use that characterization to examine the effects of model parameters on them. We also compare performance of the system to a traditional assembly system with advertising competition outside supply chain but without cooperative advertising inside.
Advertising strategies Dynamic duopoly Assembly Supply chain
Cheng Qian Debin Huang Xiaojuan Xu Xinping Wang
School of Economics and Business Administration Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, PR China Chongqing Economic Information Center Chongqing Academy Of Economics Research, Chongqing 401147, PR School of Management China University Of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 221008, PR China
国际会议
The Third International Conference on Operations and Supply Chain Management(第三届运营与供应链管理国际会议)
武汉
英文
373-380
2009-07-28(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)