Design of Quality Control Mechanism in ATO Supply Chain with Double-sided Moral Hazard Based on Quality Tracing
In this paper, a quality control model based on double-sided moral hazard is developed for the ATO (assemble-to-order) system, in which the final product manufacturer, as the core firm in the system, controls the quality of components from suppliers only by quality tracing; and the incentive mechanism for quality tracing in ATO system is designed. It is discovered that the final product manufacturer can design a reasonable quality control mechanism to stimulate component suppliers and itself to manufacture at the quality levels predetermined by both sides, as a result, the profit of ATO system and final product manufacturer will be maximized.
Assemble-to-order Quality Tracing double-sided Moral Hazard Mechanism Design
Bo Huang Wei-dong Meng Feng-ming Tao Yu-yu Li
School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China, 400044 School of Mechanical Engineering, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China, 400044
国际会议
The Third International Conference on Operations and Supply Chain Management(第三届运营与供应链管理国际会议)
武汉
英文
410-415
2009-07-28(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)