Competition, Optimal Ezercise and the Control of Monetization of Equity-Based Incentives
Equity Based Incentives (“EBIs) remain the dominant form of incentives in many developed and developing countries; and the timing of exercise of EBIs and the associated legal and economic ramifications have generated substantial debate. This article: a) critiques existing academic thought on information and exercise of employees’ incentive contracts within the context of industry competition, b) shows how Equity-Based Incentives (“EBIs) cause information assymetry, and vice versa, c) introduces the optimal conditions for exercise of EBIs by ‘insiders’. The analysis of optimal exercise of EBIs may help in formulation of appropriate policies for taxation of EBIs, regulation of securities markets, employee compensation and regulation of competition. This article also introduces a new method of risk analysis and decision analysis that is distribution-free, dynamic and can be tailored to each situation.
Optimal ezercise of Employee Stock Options Equity-based Incentives complezity information asymmetry corporate governance competition
Michael C.Nwogugu
P.O.Box 996, Newark, NJ 07101, USA
国际会议
The Third International Conference on Operations and Supply Chain Management(第三届运营与供应链管理国际会议)
武汉
英文
848-859
2009-07-28（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）