The Game Analysis for R&D Investment Activity between two Firms of Asymmetry Technologies
This paper analyzes the game procedures between asymmetry firms in the R&D investment decision-making based on dynamic game model analysis. Research results indicate that under the incomplete patent system, either large or small and medium sized knowledge-based enterprises would lose their motivation to carry out R&D investment. Under the complete patent system, the large-sized enterprises have the fundamental motility to carry out R&D investment in order to gain an advantage in the technology and knowledge resources, while the small and medium sized ones have the cooperative and innovative intention in R&D. This conclusion is of stronger policy effects for both improving the patent system and knowledge management in the enterprises, which would undertake a key role for R&D investment activity and knowledge industries development.
R&D investment Asymmetry technology Marginal cost Dynamic game
Xun-lian SI Xue-ru LI
School of Economics and Management Xian shiyou University Xian International Studies University
国际会议
The Third International Conference on Operations and Supply Chain Management(第三届运营与供应链管理国际会议)
武汉
英文
975-980
2009-07-28（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）