Game Analysis of Cooperative Pollution Control of River Basin
The conflict of water resources environment becomes the important factors of endangering the peace and stability of regions and restricting the sustainable development of river basin. It becomes one of the important duties for water resources management to mitigate the conflict of water resources for river basin and to promote the negotiation and cooperation between parties. This paper analyzes the problem of environmental cooperation among regions in a river basin by means of optimal control theory and game theory. Based on the cooperative and non-cooperative differential game models of water environmental management in a simplified frame, we get that the cooperation among regions is possible in some conditions and if the lower agrees to compensate to the upper, both regions can be benefited from their cooperation. These conclusions provide some theoretical basis for the water resources management.
Differential Game Water Resource Pollution Control Compensation
Yujie Tao Yan Wang
Department of Mathematics, Tonghua Normal University, Tonghua, 134002, P.R.China College of Mathematics and Computational Science, China University of Petroleum (East China), Dongyi
国际会议
北京
英文
695-698
2009-07-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）