R&D Strategy And Cournot Competition With Labor-managed And Profit-mazimizing Firms
R&D strategic interaction was analyzed in two types of oligopoly: profit-maximizing firm (PMF) and labor-managed firm (LMF). By developing a two-stage game model of duopoly between PMF and LMF, we explore their production and R&D investment response curves of strategic interaction in Cournot competition. With comparative static analysis, we determined impacts of changes in their own and rivals R&D, wages, fixed costs on its optimal outputs respectively, and impacts of changes in their own and rivals R&D spillovers on optimal R&D level. Results showed there were some difference between LMF and PMF in the production and R&D investments.
R&D Strategic Interaction Labor-managed Firm Cournot competition comparative static analysis
Jianli Luo Weijun Zhong
School of Economics and Management School of Business Southeast University Wenzhou University Nanjin School of Economics and Management Southeast University Nanjing, 211189, China
国际会议
北京
英文
718-721
2009-07-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）