EQUILIBRIUM PRICING ON THE DECISION-MAKING OF PATENT TRANSFER AND RENEWAL

摘要：

How to price the patent under incomplete information is an important problem for the patent transfer.From the point of the expected gains both transfer sides obtained,`the linear equilibrium is betterr than the sole price equilibrium. The outcome of the linear equilibrium, however, does not conform to the individually rational constraint. We structure an valuation function for assessing the decision-making of the patent transfer and renewal and discuss the Bayesian equilibrium pricing of the patents transfer transaction based on the two sides valuation of patent under continuous distribution. This artical finds that there is a direct mechanism that meets the incentive compatibility and the individually rational constraint. That is to say, there is a equilibrium price which could yield higher expected total gains from the patent transfer trade.

关键词： patent transfer and renewal Incomplete information Equilibrium pricing Ezpected gains

作者: Chengyong Zhang Manhong Liu Yizhang Zhang

作者单位: Renmin University of China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: Academy of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 2009(2009创新与创业国际学术会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 11-15

在线出版日期: 2009-07-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）