The Strategic Propriety of the Prime Lending Rate:An Application of the Price-Setting Game in Banking

摘要：

This paper conducts a microeconomic study on the prime lending rate,thereby providing an alternative perspective on the bank loan market and its functions.Applying Bertrand and Stackelberg duopolistic game structures to banking,the paper formulates the prime lending rate as a lower lending rate than the Bertrand interest rate,and examines its analytical characteristics in the light of subgame perfect equilibria.

作者: Nishiyama,Shigeru

作者单位: Department of Business Administration,Kyushu International University,Kitakyushu,Fukuoka 805-8512,Japan

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: PAN-PACIFIC CONFERENCE XXVI(“战略创新、协作融合泛太平洋管理学会第26届年会)

会议地点: 深圳

会议语种:英文

页码: 248-250

在线出版日期: 2009-06-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）