Simple Power Analysis on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems and Coimtermeasures: Practical Work
Simple Power Analysis (SPA), first introduced by Kocher et al. in 1, is a technique that involves directly interpreting power consumption measurements collected during cryptographic operations. Although the possibility of attacking elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) by SPA repeatedly appears in research papers, all accessible references evade the essence of reporting conclusive experiments where actual elliptic curve cryptosystems were successfully attacked and prevented. In this paper we describe power analysis experiments conducted on 3 implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems. They are respectively binary, double-and-add-always and Montgomery methods of point multiplication. The experimental results indicate that using SPA analysis, the complete key material could be successfully retrieved from binary method, but not from double-and-add-always and Montgomery method.
Simple power analysis Differential power analysis Side channel Elliptic curve cryptosystems
Keke Wu Huiyun Li Tingding Chen Fengqi Yu
Institute of Computing Technology Shenzhen Institute of Advanced Technology Graduate University of C Department of Integrated Electronics, Shenzhen Institute of Advanced Technology Chinese Academy of S
国际会议
Second International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security(第二届电子商务与安全国际研究大会)(ISECS 2009)
南昌
英文
21-24
2009-05-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）