Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Accounting Information Distortion by Listed Companies

摘要：

This paper analyzed the behavior of strategy-selecting in interaction among Certified Public Accountants, the listed companies and regulatory authorities in market with the evolutionary game theory. The result shows that if the gain for producing distorted accounting information by listed companies is larger than the loss of being discovered and punished by regulatory authorities, or the supervising cost of regulatory authorities is too high, the distorted accounting information emerge inevitably; enforcing the punishment on listed companies and delinquent Certified Public Accountants for their producing distorted accounting information, containing their motive of producing distorted accounting information, are all the important ways to eliminate distorted accounting information provided by listed companies.

关键词： accounting information distortion evolutionary game duplicative dynamic evolutionaiy stable strategy

作者: Fangyuan Lu Bingxian Qiu Yunfei Fan

作者单位: Business School Zhengzhou University Zhengzhou, 450001, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: Second International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security(第二届电子商务与安全国际研究大会)(ISECS 2009)

会议地点: 南昌

会议语种:英文

页码: 116-119

在线出版日期: 2009-05-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）