Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set of a Finite Static Game
In order to solve the difficulty that players want to realize a pure Nash equilibria in a static finite game where principle of maximum entropy is all the playerjs common knowledge, we introduce the concept of Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (briefly, N-M stable set) which is a subset of set of all pure Nash equilibria, give an argorithm to find N-M statble set, outline existence and uniqueness of N-M stable set in a finite static strategy game with at least one pure Nash equilibrium, and show that every finite static strategy game is equivalent to one and only one ideal game. Basic on those results, players are more inteligent and it is easier for they to want to realize a pure Nash equilibrium.
Dianyu Jiang
Institute of Game Theory with Applications, Huaihai Institute of Technology
国际会议
三亚
英文
1855-1857
2009-04-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）