RESEARCH ON THE OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACT CONSIDERING CONTRACTORS INTRINSIC MOTIVATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION QUALITY INSURANCE SYSTEM
With the rapid development of the national real estate industry, we are encountering an unprecedented engineering quality safety challenge in China, and it requires that we should establish the construction quality insurance system to conform to the situation. In order to resolve the moral hazard and adverse selection problems of the contractor in the construction quality insurance system, the insurer must design a set of optimal incentive contracts for contractors to be selected, so as to judge their true information in terms of their selecting results and make them work hard. Considering the contractors intrinsic motivation, this paper sets up an optimal incentive contract model when both contractors types and actions are unobservable. Following the revelation principle, we analyze and solve the model by applying the optimal controlling theory, and we discuss the importance of intrinsic motivation. The conclusions show that the intrinsic motivation is more efficient than extrinsic incentive. Accordingly the insurer should fully consider the contractors intrinsic motivation in the contract.
Construction quality insurance moral hazard adverse selection intrinsic motivation eztrinsic incentive
XING-HAI CHEN LIE-YUN DING HAN-BIN LUO JUN SUN
School of Civil Engineering & Mechanics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074 School of Civil Engineering & Mechanics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074
国际会议
2008 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics(2008机器学习与控制论国际会议)
昆明
英文
707-712
2008-07-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）