CAPABILITY COORDINATION IN LOGISTICS SERVICE SUPPLY CHAIN WITH OPTIONS CONTRACT UNDER STACKELBERG GAME MODEL

摘要：

Logistics service supply chain is different from finished goods inventory supply chain, in which supplier-buyer coordination is approached only through logistics capability adjustment and optimization. In this paper, a coordination mechanism through options contract on logistics capability under Stackelberg game model is developed to increase the parties expected profit. Results show that the negative linear relationship exists between option price and option execute price, and the value of option price must be located in a certain scope as the core element of contract parameters under channel coordination. The effectiveness of coordination mechanism and the proposed mechanism for the allocation of surplus system expected profit is verified through a numerical study.

关键词： Options Supply Contract Channel Coordination Logistics Capability Reservation Stackelberg Game

作者: AI-PING CUI WEI LIU XU ZHANG

作者单位: School of Transportation, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, 200135, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics(2008机器学习与控制论国际会议)

会议地点: 昆明

会议语种:英文

页码: 4051-4056

在线出版日期: 2008-07-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）