Optimal Licensing Strategies of a Research Lab
This paper, aiming at monopolist R& D lab without production capability in technology-intensive industries, analyzes the effects of the new technology innovation size and the degrees of competition in related product market on the Research labs licensing strategies. If ignore contracting for patent licensing involves transferring costs, we show that the research lab always shared the same utmost profits from patent licensing for three different licensing scenarios: two-part tariff contracts, royalty contracts and fixed fee contracts, whenever have infinitude potential entrants, but these contracts required the number of licenses is different to capture the utmost profits. We find that sole licensing is the optimal strategy in linear two-part tariffs licensing contracts; the number of licenses is unlimited in the optimal royalty licensing contracts, while the optimal licensing strategy relies on the new technology innovation size and degree of competition among related products in the market in fixed fee licensing contracts, and only when the licensed technological products or process innovation size are very high, can sole licensing be the optimal strategy.
Degree of product competition Innovation size Number of licenses Research lab Technological licensing
ZHONG De-qiang ZHONG Wei-jun LIU Hui
School of Economics & Management, Southeast University, P.R.China Institute of Management Science & School of Economics & Management, Southeast University, P.R.China Institute of Management Science & Engineering, Hunan University of Technology, P.R.China
国际会议
4th International Symposium on Soft Science Innovation Nation：Theory and Practice(第四届软科学国际研讨会)
北京
英文
337-348
2006-11-28（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）