An Optimal Incentive Mechanism System in Venture Capital

摘要：

This paper aims to the principal-agent relationship between investors and venture capitalists (VCs), making research on the moral hazard issues under this relationship, and how to design an effective incentive mechanism to avoid it. By constructing a new incentive model, this paper provides the reference for investors to establish a reasonable payment contract. The designed incentive contract is a kind of dominant consecutive payment mode, which plays a strong incentive role to the VCs, in addition, it also requires the VCs to invest certain capital to the project, which can effectively prevent the slapdash action of VCs, and reduce the agent cost of investors.

关键词： Investor Venture Capitalists Principal-Agent Relationship

作者: LIANG Peng

作者单位: School of Management, Central South University, Changsha, P.R.China, 410083 Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University, Japan, 060 -0809

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009年战略管理国际会议(2009 International Conference on Strategic Management)

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

页码: 1211-1215

在线出版日期: 2009-06-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）