A Theoretical Analysis on Credit Cheating in E-Commerce

摘要：

Based on a simplified evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the internal mechanism of credit cheating behaviors in E-Commerce business. With regard to potentially technological or rule defaults in credit system as well as tradersselfish rationality, presence of credit cheating is to some extent unavoidable. A new kind of credit system, which is independently coexistent with traders, should be set up to control credit cheating.

关键词： E-Commerce credit system credit cheating evolutionary game theory model of species coezistence

作者: Zheng Li

作者单位: Department of Information and Technology, Zhejiang Vocational College of Commerce, Hangzhou, 310053, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第八届武汉电子商务国际会议(The Eighth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 123-126

在线出版日期: 2009-05-30（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）