Incomplete Financial Contracts between Venture Capitalist and Entrepreneurs with Asymmetric Information
This paper applies the framework of incomplete contracts to analyze the problems about the allocation of control rights and the incentives of entrepreneurs. We get the necessary and sufficient conditions on which the optimal action is selected in different allocations of control rights. This paper also explains the reason why contingent controls are commonly used in venture capital corporation. when the corporations performance become poor, venture capitalists usually get the control rights. When the performances become better, the entrepreneurs usually continue to have control rights.
venture capital incomplete contracts asymmetric information contingent control
Shengcou Wang Yong Zeng
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 610054, China
国际会议
第八届武汉电子商务国际会议(The Eighth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business)
武汉
英文
1512-1518
2009-05-30（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）