Analysis of Encouragement and Stipulation on Managers in Small and Medium-sized Businesses Based on Game Theory

摘要：

In most modern small and medium-sized businesses, the business is managed by professional managers, which always brings the problem of moral risk. How to encourage and stipulate manager is crucial to the development of small and medium-sized businesses. In this paper, one-shot game and repeated game are used to analyze the factors influencing managers behaviors, and some countermeasures are put forward to improve the managersbehaviors.

关键词： Moral Risk One-shot Came Repeated Game Mediumsized and Small Business

作者: GAO Zhijie

作者单位: Department of Economics and Management, Northeast Agricultural University, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Tenth West Lake International Conference on Small & Medium Business(第十届西湖国际中小企业研讨会)

会议地点: 杭州

会议语种:英文

页码: 411-414

在线出版日期: 2008-10-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）