Quantitive Evaluation of Job Applicants Abilities by SMEs under Asymmetric Information

摘要：

The information asymmetry is more and more serious in the labor market since job employment becomes difficult. In order to get a satisfying job, the applicant is likely to provide SMEs（employers) with false information about his or her abilities. It is difficult for SMEs to identify the applicants true capability during the recruiting process and leads to the cost increasing and the efficiency of recruitment lost. This paper sets a mathematical model with the penalty function and the accordant function to evaluate applicants abilities. In order to identify the asymmetric information about jobs applicants, the empirical result shows our model can improve the efficiency of employment recruiting and makes applicants and SMEs get optimal matching under information asymmetry in the labor market.

关键词： Asymmetric Information Evaluation model Job applicants SMEs

作者: WANG Guipu LUO Qiao

作者单位: Zhejiang University of Technology, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Tenth West Lake International Conference on Small & Medium Business(第十届西湖国际中小企业研讨会)

会议地点: 杭州

会议语种:英文

页码: 449-454

在线出版日期: 2008-10-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）