An Analyzes on the Factors and Dynamical Game Process of Enterprise Technology Innovation

摘要：

This paper analyzes the enterprise technology innovation dynamic gambling process. When there is technical and cost difference, the technical-leading enterprise engaging in technical innovation and the technical-backward one engaging in technical imitation is a Nash equilibrium solution. On the contrary, when there is no technical and cost difference, it is an optimal gambling strategy for the two enterprises to choose innovation strategy at the same time. This dynamic process possibly leads technical-backward enterprise to becoming technical-leading one. It also puts forward countermeasures on how to enhance enterprise technical innovation ability of our country and reduce our enterprise technological disparity with the technical-powerful nation.

关键词： technology innovation technology imitation dynamic game analyze

作者: Sun Jingshui Cui Litao

作者单位: School of Statistics, Zhe Jiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou, 310035

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008年国际应用统计学术研讨会(2008 International Institute of Applied Statistics Studies)

会议地点: 烟台

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-10

在线出版日期: 2008-08-14（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）