Technology License in Two-sided Markets
In this paper, we study the technology licensing and market entry strategies of a incumbent and entrant. We find if the incumbent platform firm chooses the technology license fee less than some one critical level, then the entrant platform firms superior reaction is not to enter; If the technology license fee for take is higher than the some critical level, then the superior reaction of the entrant is enter.Moreover, if the incumbents original network scale and the network externality is enough strong, then the incumbent chooses monopolistic licensing fee, and the entrant dont enter. If the original network advantage isnt very strong, then the emergence of the latent entrants making the incumbent will lower the technology license fee, and formation entry barrier.
Technology licensing Market entry Platform firm
PAN Xiaojun CHEN Hongmin
School of Economics & Management, Shanghai JiaoTong University, P.R.China 200052
国际会议
The International Conference on Management of Technology(2008太原技术管理国际研讨会)
太原
英文
15-18
2008-08-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）