Dynamic Cost-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising
We study the Cost-Per-Action or Cost-Per-Acquisition (CPA) charging scheme in online advertising. In this scheme, instead of paying per click, the advertisers pay only when a user takes a specific action (e.g. Fills out a form) or completes a transaction on their websites. We focus on designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms that use this charging scheme. We describe a mechanism based on a sampling-based learning algorithm that under suitable assumptions is asymptotically individually rational, asymptotically Bayesian incentive compatible and asymptotically ex-ante ecient. In particular, we demonstrate our mechanism for the case where the utility functions of the advertisers are independent and identically-distributed random variables as well as the case where they evolve like independent reflected Brownian motions.
Mechanism Design Cost-Per-Action Internet Advertising
Hamid Nazerzadeh Amin Saberi Rakesh Vohra
Stanford University Stanford, CA 94304 Northwestern University Evanston, IL 60208
国际会议
第十七届国际万维网大会(the 17th International World Wide Web Conference)(WWW08)
北京
英文
2008-04-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）