Wireless Spectrum Sharing via Waiting-Line Auction
We propose a wireless spectrum sharing framework based on waiting-line auction 1. Our framework includes both spectrum assignment and power allocation; it is designed to maximize the primary user’s profits as well as to optimize the overall rate under secondary users’ minimal rate requirements. On secondary users’side, it is proved that bidders could achieve equilibrium bids according to Nash Equilibrium strategy function, which relate to their valuations for communications. For the primary user, we design a low-complexity auction clearing algorithm that considers both primary user’s revenue and the system overall rate.
dynamic spectrum sharing game theory waitingline auction power allocation water-filling
Tao Han Tianyi Xing Ning Zhang Kaiming Liu Bihua Tang Yuanan Liu
Key Lab.of Universal Wireless Communications,Ministry of Education (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications Beijing,China
国际会议
广州
英文
2008-11-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）