会议专题

Using Returns Policies to Improve the Supply Chain Performance under Retailers Competition with Price- Dependent Demand

This paper investigates a returns policy for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, offers a returns policy to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season. Under the offered contract terms, the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer prior to the season and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season. The process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the Bayesian Nash game. On the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers, the manufacturer designs the returns policy. Adopting the classic newsboy problem model framework and using numerical study methods, this study finds that the provision of returns policy can obtain better performance (Pareto improvement) than in a price-only contract. In addition, we have analysed the other impact factors on the supply chain performance.

Supply Chain Management Pricing Returns Policy Channel Coordination

Zhong YAO Stephen, C.H.LEUNG K.K.LAI

School of Economics and Management,BeiHang Unviersity,Beijing 100083,China Department of Management Sciences,City University of Hong Kong,China

国际会议

工业工程与系统管理2007年国际会议(International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Systems Management)(IESM 2007)

北京

英文

2007-05-30(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)