The Optimal Incentive Contract for University- Industry Cooperative Innovation Based on Knowledge Sharing
In this paper we use multi-task principal-agent theory to design optimal contract which incent knowledge sharing and R&D effort synchronously in the context of university and industry cooperative innovation based on unilateral knowledge flow. The characters of the optimal contract and the relationship between parameters and the effort levels of knowledge sharing and R&D of the university are analyzed. We argue that though improving enterprise’s transform capability of the new technology into profit, reducing the costs of knowledge sharing and R&D, reducing the uncertainty of outcome of new knowledge, the risk rate returns will be improved and the effort levels of knowledge sharing and R&D of university will also be improved synchronously.
Incentive mechanism Cooperative innovation Knowledge sharing R&D efforts
Ya Nan MA Guang hui ZHANG
Management School of Xian Jiao Tong University,Xian,Shaanxi,China 710049 College of Economics and Management,South China Agricultural University,Guangzhou,China 510642
国际会议
北京
英文
2007-05-30(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)