Games of Setting Optimal Markdown Timing for Perishable Products
This paper deals with a kind of specific retailing that sells a fixed stock of perishable goods over a finite horizon. The competition between two retailers is taken into account. A Stackelberg game and a Cournot game are proposed respectively based on Gallego and van Ryzin’s two-price policy. With the help of illustrations, it can be found that the two-type game models have the same equilibrium points. Compared with the pricing policy without consideration of competition, the optimal markdown timing of the leading product will be delayed and that of the following product will be advanced. A numerical example is given and the effects of the customer transfer probability between suppliers on the equilibrium of the game are also analyzed. The models proposed in this paper are helpful for the competitive retailers to determine the markdown timing for their perishable products.
Perishable product Revenue management Dynamic pricing Game
Anping YU Hui YANG Xiaolan WANG
School of Business,Nanjing University,Nanjing,China School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing,China
国际会议
北京
英文
2007-05-30（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）