A Research on Financial Monitoring Capability Boundary of Manager Contract

摘要：

With the method of economic mathematics,the thesis studies the financial monitoring capability boundary of manager contract.It advances that the determination of incentive payment coefficient can be regarded as the quantization standard that financial monitoring subject implements financial monitoring capacity.As financial monitoring contract is a suboptimal contract,the internal design can be deduced from the traditional incentive payment coefficient equation determination.Meanwhile,it researches the allocation of manager financial monitoring power under the incentive payment coefficient.It believes that the controlling part should allocate more monitoring power to the controlled part when the monitoring efficiency is high,since the controlled part will raise its self-discipline probability on its behalf.On the contrary,the controlling part will concentrate more financial monitoring power in itself.And the research proves the importance of self-discipline mechanism of the financial monitoring object.

关键词： Capability boundary Financial monitoring Incentive payment Manager contract

作者: Han Peng

作者单位: School of Economics and Management,Henan Polytechnic University,P.R.China,454000

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第三届产品创新管理国际会议(The 3rd International Conference on Product Innovation Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2008-10-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）